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When it comes to international diplomacy, the UK has benefited considerably from being part of
the EU. But can it maintain its influence at the UN without an EU membership? Megan Dee and
Karen E. Smith outline the challenges and opportunities in this area after Brexit.
As divorce proceedings commence, attentions around the world turn to the specifics of what the
UK’s exit from the EU will look like, and, crucially, cost. Whilst these negotiations will occupy
much column space for the next two years and beyond, a fundamental question remains of what
the cost of Brexit will be for the UK’s international influence. How does Brexit impact the UK’s wider
international role and its relationships with Europe and the world at large? Such a question is even
more pertinent when looked at from the perspective of the United Nations (UN), where the UK has
considerably benefitted from its membership of the EU, and where the UK’s post-Brexit performance
will be most starkly judged, and legitimised, by its partners and the world at large.
It is worth noting that the UK is widely considered to be one of the UN’s more influential members, its
position being characterised, above all, by its permanent membership of the UN Security Council. The UK is the
sixth largest contributor to the UN’s general budget (contributing 4.5%) and peacekeeping budget (contributing
5.8%). Since 2013, the UK has also been one of the few developed countries that meets the UN target of giving
0.7% of its gross national income in official development aid.
UK influence has, however, also been boosted by its membership of the EU, which is the most well-organised and
well-resourced group at the UN. There is virtually nothing at the UN on which the EU does not have a position.
Through intense coordination, EU member states try to reach agreement on joint statements, the sponsorship of
resolutions, and united voting positions. They are not always successful, but EU unity at the UN is striking, and
contrasts favourably with the unity of many other political groups.
The UK’s status as an EU member also matters because group politics is, and will continue to be, fundamental to
UN politics. Whether it is over human rights, or on nuclear weapons, the UK cannot go it alone. In both examples
and across the UN more broadly, groups are becoming a driving force of multilateralism. The UK will therefore be
severely limited if it seeks to pursue its interests within the UN without recourse either to the EU or other groups.
Diplomats in the UN often speak and sponsor resolutions on behalf of groups, and spend a good deal of time
exchanging information, coordinating positions, and agreeing on initiatives within the context of groups. Groups at
the UN comprise not only the five formal regional blocs, but also a burgeoning number of political groups. These
include regional or other intergovernmental organisations such as ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Nordic
Group and so on. They also include more informal political groups formed either as permanent caucusing groups to
the UN i.e. JUSCANZ (Japan, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as well as Norway and Iceland), or as
single-issue lobbying groups, such as the Small Island Developing States.
Working within the EU at the UN has therefore been of significant benefit to the UK. Within the Human Rights
Council, for example, the EU is considered a major power. It is an active participant in debates, with the presidency
usually presenting around 40-50 statements on behalf of EU member states each session. It also frequently
sponsors resolutions and has been the principal forum through which British diplomacy has worked on human
rights. Another example is that of the UN’s nuclear disarmament forums. On nuclear politics the EU has, at times,
acted as a crucial hub for information sharing between its members, has provided the UK with important political
cover for its nuclear-weapon status, and has also been a constant champion of the global nuclear non-proliferation
regime to which the UK is a major supporter.
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Of course EU coordination is frustrating, being both time-consuming and slow, and often results in lowest common
denominator outcomes. In UN nuclear politics, the EU is frequently criticised for its rhetoric and ambiguity because
its common position is the bare minimum of what its – highly diverse when it comes to nuclear issues – member
states can agree to. Consequently, many EU member states, including the UK, have looked to other political groups
to ensure their interests, which not only weakens EU unity but stretches the capacity of the member states involved.
By removing itself from the EU, the UK would therefore be removing itself from the requirement, set out in the Treaty
of European Union, to coordinate with the other EU-27 on multilateral matters.
Brexit could, in turn, allow the EU to refocus its diplomatic activities onto other cross-regional activities. The UK has
itself been at the forefront of efforts to enhance coordination between the ‘P-5’ (permanent members of the UN
Security Council) on matters relating to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The UK nevertheless has limited options when it comes to allying itself with alternative groups. The Commonwealth
– highlighted during the referendum as a potential avenue for UK influence – has never intervened in the Human
Rights Council or any of the UN’s nuclear forums, and, across the UN more generally, Commonwealth members are
far more active within groups such as the African Group or Non-Aligned Movement. The WEOG and JUSCANZ
meanwhile are mainly information sharing groups, and whilst JUSCANZ may coordinate on some human rights
issues, the UK would likely face resistance from other members if it sought to turn it into more of a caucus.  More
than this though, the aim of cross-regional diplomatic activity is typically to work with one (or more) states in the
hope that they can ‘bring along’ others from their region. States on the margins of groups – not least a group as
important as the EU – are thus deemed less attractive.
What will therefore matter for UK diplomacy and influence at the UN post-Brexit, will be the UK’s relationship and
diplomacy vis-à-vis the EU. At the Human Rights Council the UK cannot hope to exert leverage without recourse in
some way to the EU who, in the large part, it agrees with anyway. Even in the UN’s nuclear forums, where the EU is
oftentimes weak and divided, the EU remains a group that other actors tend to listen to and who the UK finds
considerable common ground on matters relating to non-proliferation. An immediate dilemma therefore faces a post-
Brexit UK at the UN. Will the UK allow itself to work with, or even follow, the EU where matters of like-mindedness
arise, or will it seek to take the lead separate and apart?
What is clear is that, in walking away from the EU, the UK must now undertake a substantive review, and indeed
rewiring, of its international relations and diplomatic channels. Such rewiring will be time-consuming and extensive
and, in certain policy fields, being a follower of the EU may present the UK its only, and certainly easiest, choice. For
example, the UK could formally align with EU statements – joining the company of other non-EU European states
such as Liechtenstein, Norway and Moldova – though this would require an EU-UK agreement to that effect. In the
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longer-term however, the UK may need to seek ways of partnering more formally with the EU on matters of common
foreign and security interests at the UN and, in so doing, utilise elements of a previously successful relationship to
mutual advantage.
______
Note: The above draws on the authors article in the BREXIT special issue of the The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations (open access; DOI: 10.1177/1369148117710208).
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